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Abstract 
This work seeks to comprehend the interplay between longitudinal life courses and 
financial well-being in retirement. To attain previous objective, we compare family-work 
trajectories of cohorts born between 1930 and 1960 in both Spain, the prototype of a 
conservative welfare state, and the Netherlands, representing a liberal idiosyncrasy where 
private pensions play a big role in retirement matters. Using data from SHARE survey, 
we conduct multi-channel sequence analysis and cluster analysis to identify groups of 
typical life courses in both states. Afterwards, regression models are built to estimate how 
similar life courses lead to different retirement outcomes, depending on the pension 
regime. Findings support that, despite having higher pension payments, the system 
instituted in the Netherlands intensifies pension penalties for typical female family-work 
trajectories. Conclusions also encompass the effects of implementing Dutch pension 
policies in the Spanish context. 
Keywords: Pensions, pay-as-you-go system, replacement rate, multi-channel sequence 
analysis, financial well-being. 
Resumen ejecutivo 
Este trabajo pretende comprender la relación existente entre las trayectorias vitales y el 
bienestar financiero en la jubilación. A fin de alcanzar el objetivo previamente descrito, 
comparamos las trayectorias familiares y profesionales de cohortes nacidos entre 1930 y 
1960 en España, prototipo de estado del bienestar conservador, y Holanda, país con una 
idiosincrasia más liberal que otorga un papel más relevante a la parte privada. A partir de 
los datos obtenidos de la encuesta SHARE, hemos realizado un análisis secuencial para 
determinar las trayectorias vitales más comunes en ambos países. Seguidamente, se han 
construido una serie de modelos de regresión para estimar en qué medida experiencias 
similares resultan en diferentes niveles de bienestar, dependiendo del régimen de 
pensiones en cuestión. Nuestros hallazgos respaldan el hecho que, aún proporcionando a 
sus jubilados pensiones más elevadas, el sistema holandés penaliza, en mayor medida, la 
trayectoria vital típica de las mujeres. Nuestras conclusiones engloban, además, los 
efectos potenciales de implementar políticas de pensiones holandesas en el contexto 
español. 
Palabras clave: Pensiones, sistema de reparto, tasa de sustitución, análisis secuencial, 
bienestar financiero.
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, retirement has taken a central position in public and academic debate 
across Spain. Persistent increments in Social Security’s deficit and the exhaustion of the 
reserve fund have raised the alarm and made people worry about their future retirement.  
The challenges faced by the current system of intergenerational solidarity emerge from 
demographic evolution and persistent unemployment. Indeed, a higher dependency ratio1 
derived from population ageing and the decrease in Social Security contributions due to 
low employment rates; represent a threat for the long-term sustainability of Spanish 
pensions. In front of this cause for concern, many voices advocate for the necessity to 
introduce modifications in today’s idiosyncrasy, and plenty of proposals for a transition 
to a new private or mixed system are on the table. Despite the general willingness for an 
updated pensions’ paradigm, experts several times differ in which would be the right path 
to follow. 
Professor Xavier Sala i Martín and the economist Juan Ramón Rallo, ensure the Spanish 
pension system is unsustainable, arguing that aggregated worker’s contribution to Social 
Security is, by far, lower than the total compensation perceived during retirement years. 
They both support a scheme based on individual capitalization of savings, where private 
pension funds compete for offering the best conditions (elEconomista, 2 de diciembre de 
2014. “El sistema de pensiones actual es insostenible: así pueden pueden ser las 
soluciones del futuro”2).  
Another alternative suggested by experts is the transition to a notional defined 
contribution model (NDC), grounded in two main principles: the retirement income 
perceived must be proportional to individual contributions, and the age for retirement 
should be flexible, with life expectancy considered in the calculation of pension income 
accrual (Valero, Artís, Ayuso, & García, 2011). 
Conversely, arguments in favour of the current pay-as-you-go system appeal to the 
instability of financial markets, and the impossibility to align them with an instrument 
that pretends to ensure a stable and safety retirement. (Luis Martínez Noval, 21 de enero 
de 2011. “En defensa del sistema de reparto”. El País3). 
Disparities also arise when looking at European neighbours. Countries in the north, for 
instance Sweden, The Netherlands, Denmark or United Kingdom, are in favour of a 
                                                
1 The dependency ratio is an age-population ratio of those typically not in the labour force (0 to 15 and 
65+) and those typically in the labour force (15 to 64). 
2 Retrieved from “http://www.eleconomista.es/espana/noticias/6293400/12/14/Es-sostenible-el-sistema-
publico-de-pensiones-Posibles-soluciones-para-el-futuro.html”. 
3 Retrieved from “http://elpais.com/diario/2011/01/21/opinion/1295564412_850215.html”. 
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“personal choice” system, in which the individual is the one who decides to subscribe a 
public or a private plan. The majority of Eastern Europe has pure private systems, whereas 
countries in centre, such as Germany, or France, have developed an intermediate version 
where a compulsory public system coexists with a substantial part privately managed. 
Finally, southern countries like Italy, Greece, or Portugal, opt for a pay-as-you-go system, 
similar to the Spanish one. 
In light of the above, we aim to discover how the transition to a new model, inspired by 
one of these alternatives, will affect Spanish retirees’ financial well-being. The bottom 
line is to identify which determinants within other schemes could be included in a 
hypothetical Spanish pension reform to secure a growing number of retirees’ financial 
well-being in an efficient and sustainable way. 
One of the most discussed deficits asserted by current system’s detractors concerns the 
poor development of Spanish private pensions (Hernández de Cos, Jimeno & Ramos, 
2017), a phenomenon tightly related with its retirees' excessive dependency on the public 
party. This fact does not represent a problem itself but, population ageing, added to an 
increasing demand for pension funds, have sapped expectations about the model's 
sustainability. Therefore, we pretend to analyse the outcomes of a hypothetical transition 
to a system with more and high quality private participation.  
To achieve this objective, we conduct a study in which the Spanish pension system, that 
follows a traditional conservative structure, is empirically compared with the Dutch, a 
liberal alternative with little portion of retirees’ income coming from public sources, but 
compensated by a high-developed private sector. The methodology employed evaluates 
potential benefits on retirees’ financial well-being from implementing Dutch alternatives 
in the Spanish context. 
Retirees’ financial well-being has been object of study for a long time by economists and 
sociologists alike (e.g., Clark, Morrill & Allen, 2011; Disney & Johnson, 2000; Kosloski, 
Ginsburg & Backman, 1984). Further studies also emphasize the relation between life 
course trajectories and financial well-being in retirement, often framed within the notion 
of cumulative advantage or disadvantage (CAD) across the life course (e.g., Blossfeld, 
Buchholz, & Hofäcker, 2006; Dannefer, 2003; Han & Moen, 1999). In relation to life 
trajectories, more than a few retirement studies (Buchholz, 2006; Warner and Hofmeister, 
2006) stress the importance of including not only working careers, but also family events 
in individual’s longitudinal life courses. Employment interruptions that usually lead to a 
lower pension accrual, are closely related to family events such as marrying, childcare 
etc.  
We draw on this strong correlation between family life courses and employment 
trajectories to analyse how the Spanish and the Dutch pension systems, both endorsed by 
different interpretations of the welfare state, shape the well-being of retirees with similar 
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working careers and family conditions. Then, we examine which life courses result in 
well-off conditions at retirement, and which others are the most disadvantaged in both 
frameworks. Eventually, the main concern is to analyse the financial well-being provided 
by the Dutch pension system on typical Spanish family-work trajectories, aiming to detect 
if this step forward to sustainability will, at the same time, improve living conditions of 
the majority. 
In particular, to conduct the analysis, we compare the cohorts born between 1930 and 
1960 that experienced their active family formation and working careers, between 1950 
and 2000, in two societies characterized by a strong male-breadwinner context with many 
cultural similarities.  
We make use of the exceptionally rich dataset from SHARELIFE, and employ sequence 
analysis to build different clusters, for grouping similar family-work trajectories in both 
societies. SHARELIFE dataset is characterized by going beyond snapshot information 
with a questionnaire that includes longitudinal life experiences from entire adult’s life4. 
Afterwards, the financial well-being of retirees in each cluster is evaluated, under both 
pension systems, by conducting a regression analysis to see interactions between family-
work trajectories and variables representing financial-well-being in retirement. 
The methodology employed pursues a double objective. Primarily, the evaluation of a 
hypothetical reform that brings Spanish pensions closer to the Dutch model. Our second 
input concerns the identification of cluster groups presenting a high poverty risk in 
retirement, and propose a set of social policies to mitigate the difficulties these persons 
encounter in today’s system. This second objective is attained by identifying Dutch 
policies that successfully protect these collectives in risk and, afterwards, assess its 
applicability in the Spanish system of Social Security. 
This work’s social perspective is crucial to interpret concluding remarks as the focus is 
placed on individual's well-being and not on economic efficiency. Rather than an ultimate 
solution to deal with existing inefficiencies and enhance financial sustainability of 
pension systems, this work seeks to identify retiree profiles at risk of poverty in the 
current scenario and evaluate their expected well-being in a hypothetical new paradigm, 
where private pensions adopt a more determinant role. 
Conclusions should be taken into consideration for further structural reforms in pension 
matters, putting special emphasis on protecting disadvantaged groups with less resources 
in retirement.  
                                                
4 SHARELIFE dataset corresponds to Wave 3 of the SHARE survey.  
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CHAPTER I. RETIREMENT PENSIONS IN MATURE 
WELFARE STATES: TWO DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
The welfare state was consolidated in developed societies after the second World War, 
aiming to provide citizens with a safety net by guaranteeing a set of basic services to the 
whole population. It was conceived as a social project’s yearning that pretends to offer 
protection to individuals not able to maintain a minimum standard of living. This idea of 
security and prosperity became popular, specially among European countries, devastated 
after the war; where citizens entrusted their children’s education, retirement plans and 
healthcare to the state. 
This initial conception of the welfare state has evolved throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century, and has reached its maximum splendour nowadays, in democratic 
countries with capitalist economies. Its glory days arrived not without earlier overcoming 
strong criticism, specially in economic turndowns such as the oil crisis in 1973. One of 
the core values of the welfare state, still present nowadays, concerns government 
intervention in the economy, with the objective to redress imbalances and compensate 
deficiencies of the private sector5. Many neoliberal parties strongly disagreed with the 
previous statement, blaming this interventionism for economic crises as it strips private 
firm’s earnings and disincentives them for being more efficient.  
Without forgetting its chilling effect on the economy, further sections evince that 
government interventionism is a must do for the system’s financing. This involvement is 
managed by means of a complex network of Social Security regimes, through which the 
State guarantees an acceptable well-being for the whole population and regulates essential 
services publicly provided.    
According to Beveridge report (1994), the Social Security is defined as a set of measures 
adopted by the State to protect citizens from particular risks, which are not going to 
disappear despite an optimal situation in the society. Conceptually, taking into 
consideration Beveridge’s definition, it is possible to argue that a Social Security regime 
is sustained by two fundamental principles: solidarity and sufficiency.  
The origin of these two pillars dates back to Otto Von Bismarck’s Prussia in the XIX 
century and, subsequently, to Great Britain in the forties (Maianti Lázaro & María,  2014). 
The social insurance was created to abolish indigence in view of little social protection 
and high inequality between different productive sectors. It pretended to ensure a 
reasonable well-being for all citizens facing an impossibility or a limitation to access 
                                                
5 Keynesian economics inspired the creation of the welfare state in a desire to prevent economic 
development from being detrimental to social welfare and individuals’ well-being.  
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earnings (divorced people, widowed people, unemployed etc.). The system was 
conceived to be universal; everyone in risk should be attended despite his ability to pay 
for the service provided.  
This principle of universalism, raised the issue of sustainability. States pretended to attain 
a financial equilibrium that will have ensured the long-term survival of their Social 
Security institutions. The mentioned prosperity was achieved by requiring some 
contributions to the system and with the help of public policy to influence individuals’ 
life-decisions.  
It is crucial not to lose sight of these two principles because they lay the foundations of 
many modern Social Security regimes and are still present in existing legislation. In 
general, most Social Security systems are in line with these two values: there are some 
universal compensations destined to satisfy the most basic needs (sufficiency) but also 
others in which the individual has to contribute to the financial equilibrium of the system 
(solidarity). 
Non-forgetting Beveridge’s definition, Social Security systems are, in practice, far from 
being homogeneous. The pillar of solidarity implies renouncing to own resources for the 
benefit of the society and indirectly finance services, which might be unnecessary or 
useless for the individual. While this implication is not well seen in highly individualistic 
societies, like the US, others more collectivist, like Nordic countries, are predisposed to 
transfer many competences to the government, at the expense of their own wealth. These 
ideological differences set the basis for having heterogeneous Social Security regimes in 
the international context. 
Disparities in the desired degree of government implication in individual affairs derive in 
asymmetries concerning Social Security competences and scope of action. Among the 
areas of activity shaped by the previously stated cultural and economic differences, is our 
main concern, retirement pension schemes.  
1.1. Pensions in the international context 
Pension systems are a consequence of the welfare state implications. In line with the 
argument presented in previous section, its core objective is to ensure a minimum well-
being for individuals facing an impossibility to access earnings. This limitation 
encompasses a set of eventualities mainly related with retirement, death and disease.  
The basic outline for pension schemes is grounded in the theory of the three pillars from 
Lovaina’s Code, strongly related with the previously mentioned principles of solidarity 
and sufficiency: 
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Table 1: Summary of the three pillars from Lovaina’s code 
Social Security systems 
Levels 
Collective 
covered 
Financing Compensations Management 
Basic (1) 
• Universal • General 
Taxes 
• Healthcare 
• Family aid 
• Disability 
• Retirement 
(minimum 
compensation) 
• Unemployment 
• Orphanage and 
widower’s pension 
• Social benefits for 
special needs 
• Public 
Professional 
(2) 
• Employed 
•  Self-employed 
• Public servants 
• Professional 
contributions 
with fiscal 
benefits 
• Complements up to 
a maximum 
threshold 
• Temporal and 
permanent disability 
• Complements to 
retirement 
• Orphanage and 
widower’s pension 
• Unemployment 
• Public or 
private with 
public 
supervision 
Voluntary (3) 
• Freelancers 
• Self-employed 
• Small farmers, 
dealers and 
industries 
• Employees and 
public servants 
(voluntary 
nature) 
• Others 
• Voluntary 
contributions 
with fiscal 
benefits 
• Voluntary 
complements to the 
previous levels 
• Private sector 
• Individual 
prevision 
plans 
• Social 
insurance 
Source: Fundación Inverco, 2017 
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- A first basic level, universal and at the service of all citizens despite their contribution 
to the system’s financing. This level appeals to the principle of sufficiency and implies 
the provision of basic services to the whole population. Another point worth mentioning 
is that compensations regarding this first level are financed with general taxes. 
- The second level, also named the professional level, concerns contributions of both firms 
and individuals. Appealing to the solidarity principle, this pillar aims to ensure the long-
term sustainability of the system. Individual contributions derive in future compensations 
to those having performed a professional activity and, ideally, the size of their future 
benefit should be proportional to the amount of their contributions. 
- Finally, a third level is included in which every individual, covered or not by the second 
level, can contract a prevision plan based on his needs. This contribution has a voluntary 
nature and every person can contract it individually. 
Without forgetting the theoretical basis of the three pillars, disparities in Social Security 
regimes result in different pension schemes’ composition. Each country stablishes its own 
version of the three pillars by introducing particularities in issues such as the nature of 
contributions (compulsory or voluntary), the freedom for selecting the risk of retirement 
investments or retirement income payback.  
Therefore and, with an eye on further sections, we are required to build a common 
framework for evaluating different alternatives in retirement concerns, aiming to 
highlight both similarities and differences across countries. The idea is to characterize a 
pension scheme by a set of common dimensions, with the objective to ease both 
descriptions and comparisons. To achieve this purpose, we appeal to the following four 
dimensions purposed in a seminary for the Spanish pension reform, convened by the 
Social Security institution in 2011 (Antolín, 2011): 
1. The system’s compulsory or voluntary nature 
2. How are pensions financed 
3. If contributions are subject or not to a labour relationship 
4. The ratio between contributions and payments 
The first criterion depends directly on legislation, which stablishes if individuals are 
required (or not) to contract a pension plan for their retirement years. 
Regarding pensions’ financing, countries employ two main alternatives: pay-as-you-go 
systems, where retirement pensions are paid with current workers’ contributions, or 
systems financed through individual capitalization of savings. 
The third criterion used to classify old-age pension schemes appeals to the existence of a 
labour relationship when saving for retirement. Therefore, pension plans might be 
occupational (linked to an employment or professional relationship) or personal (not 
linked to working life).  
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Finally, the fourth criterion concerns the replacement rate of pensions6. On the one hand, 
defined benefit schemes (DB) are based on a promise to receive a certain amount of 
income at retirement. This is the case of the pay-as-you-go system where benefits are 
linked through a formula to the member’s wage, length of employment, or other factors. 
On the other hand, in defined contribution schemes (DC) future pensions are guaranteed 
by the investment itself, and the amount perceived depends exclusively on its rate of 
return. 
Apart from this framework hired as a guideline to analyse pensions in an international 
context, other factors such as fund’s ownership are of great importance. Eventually, it is 
essential to identify the objectives pursued by Social Security institutions within each 
country; fight poverty, redistribution or simply guarantee a certain amount of savings at 
retirement.  
In relation to the four dimensions described, countries are, in practise, entitled to mixture, 
in which every alternative is present to some extent. Thence, the point is to analyse the 
weight of each dimension in pension schemes’ composition. Most countries have both 
public and private pension plans which might be compulsory or voluntary. Likewise, a 
pay-as-you-go component is present in almost every Social Security system despite the 
existence of additional complements from other sources. An interesting method to 
identify these weights is an aggregated bar plot with replacement rates broken down into 
different categories according to income’s origin. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the gross replacement rate’s composition for workers with a range 
of different earnings levels: between 0,5 and 1,5 times the average worker earnings 
(AW)7. Replacement rates presented reflect the situation in the year 2014 and onwards. 
Calculations to obtain the pension system parameters for all pension entitlements show 
the theoretical retirement benefit of a worker who enters in the system today, at an age of 
20, and retires at legal retirement age after a full career. This approach enables us to detect 
structural differences and compare countries on a systematic basis, forgetting about 
individual circumstances and economic environment.  
Results suggest that complements to mandatory public pensions play a large role in 
providing incomes for old age, specially in countries presumed among the best well-being 
providers, such as the Netherlands, Denmark or Iceland. The OECD average for gross 
replacement rates of an average earner from public schemes alone is 41%, compared with 
58% when mandatory private, both DB and DC, and voluntary DC schemes are taken into 
account.  
                                                
6 The replacement rate is calculated as the average first pension as a share of the average wage at retirement. 
7 Pension entitlements presented include reforms before June 2015. 
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Figure 1: Pension entitlement in OECD countries for workers earning 0.5 times AW 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2015), Pensions at Glance 
Figure 2: Pension entitlement in OECD countries for AW 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2015), Pensions at Glance 
Figure 3: Pension entitlement in OECD countries for workers earning 1.5 times AW 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2015), Pensions at Glance 
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Furthermore, in OECD countries where voluntary DC pensions are widespread the 
average replacement rate is 59% for an average earner compared with 36% when only 
mandatory schemes are considered.  
Nevertheless, mandatory public schemes are still attractive in many States as they offer 
considerably high replacement rates entitled in a secure investment (this is the case of 
Spain, Austria, Luxembourg, Greece etc.). These countries’ pension schemes architecture 
offers a presumably optimal financial situation for future retiree’s. Their main and only 
concern is if it will be possible to maintain this level of welfare for around forty-five years 
until this individual, entering today in the labour force, finishes his working career. 
Projections are not optimistic; many countries have, in recent years, implemented a set of 
reforms to strengthen the financial situation of their pension systems by tightening 
eligibility rules and decreasing pension benefits. Therefore, a decline in pension paybacks 
is expected for the next years, as a consequence of these reforms’ negative impact on 
pensions generosity.  
Table 2 depicts the projection of gross average replacement rate’s composition in EU 
member states according to the Ageing report (2015) developed by the European 
Commission. The projection horizon considered goes from 2013 to 2060, and 
replacement rates shown, account for current retirees’ pension income8.  
At a EU level, the public pension replacement ratio would decrease around 12 percentage 
points to a value near 35%. For earnings-related pensions a 39% is projected with wide 
differences across member states. Furthermore, latter remark is that the decline mentioned 
is stronger in countries where public pension replacement rates are very high, in general, 
or in comparison to others (e.g. Spain, Portugal or Poland). Results endorse the fact that 
governments in these countries have the political goal of reducing financial pressure on 
their pension systems, in view of a structure impossible to be sustained on the long run. 
This progressive decadence of public pensions could have a strongly negative effect on 
individuals if no other sources of pension entitlements are created; since mandatory public 
schemes are still the sustain for the majority in these countries. 
                                                
8 Public pension earnings-related refers to old age earnings related pension. Public pensions aggregate 
includes disability, survivor and non- earnings-related benefits. All pension aggregate includes private 
occupational and private individual benefit and it is only reported when private pensions have been 
provided. 	
The ‘Gross Average Replacement Rate’ is calculated as the average first pension as a share of the average 
wage at retirement, as reported by the Member States in the pension questionnaire.  
FR: disability schemes and non-earning-related schemes are not taken into account in the "public pensions" 
replacement rate calculation.  
LV: 2015 values taken as starting point for the gross average replacement rates. UK: new pensions (and 
therefore replacement ratios) have not been provided. 
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Table 2: Gross average replacements rates at 2013 and 2060’s projections 
 
Gross Average Replacement Rate (%) 
Public pensions earnings-
related Public pensions All pensions 
2013 2060 p.p. Change 2013 2060 
p.p. 
Change 2013 2060 
p.p. 
Change 
BE 39,5 38,8 -0,7       
BG 35,8 36,7 0,9 29,5 31,9 2,4    
CZ 43,3 49,3 6,1 32,2 33,7 1,5    
DK 53,7 60,6 7 39,7 32,8 -6,9 57,4 59,4 1,9 
DE 38,9 33,9 -5 42,5 35,5 -7    
EE 40,1 25,2 -14,9 40,1 25,2 -14,9 40,4 44,1 3,7 
IE 33,9 30,4 -3,5 31,2 28,7 -2,4    
EL 45 26,7 -18,3 38,7 22,3 -16,4 40,7 27,5 -13,2 
ES 81,9 49,7 -32,2 79 48,6 -30,4    
FR 58,3 48,9 -9,4 50,6 39,2 -11,4    
HR 35,3 18,7 -16,7 27,9 16,5 -11,4 27,9 20,7 -7,1 
IT 59,9 51,8 -8       
CY 44,2 49,2 5       
LV 38,1 19,1 -18,9 33,4 18,1 -15,3    
LT 34,9 34,8 -0,1 35 48,6 13,6    
LU 77,7 64,6 -13,1       
HU 45,5 45,2 -0,3 33 29,1 -3,9    
MT 53,6 47,4 -6,1 49,4 45,6 -3,9    
NL 28,3 27,4 -0,9 29,8 28,3 -1,4 52,4 52 -0,3 
AT 42,9 41 -1,9 51 44,7 -6,3    
PL 53 28,7 -24,4       
PT 57,5 30,7 -26,7 55,8 36,6 -19,2    
RO 35,6 33,7 -1,9       
SI 36,1 34,1 -2,1       
SK 51,7 49,4 -2,4 51,7 49,4 -2,4 51,7 53,1 1,3 
FI 42,6 42 -0,6 46 44,1 -1,9    
SE 35 23,7 -11,3 35,6 29 -6,7 40,9 35,2 -5,7 
UK          
NO 43,7 36,2 -7,5       
EU* 43,8 36 -7,8 47,5 35,3 -12,3    
EA* 53 44,2 -8,9 47,9 35,3 -12,6    
EU** 45,7 39 -6,8 68 53,4 -9    
EA** 47,6 39,2 -8,4 72 56,7 -9,4    
* Weighted average. ** Simple average. 	
Source: Ageing Report, 2015 
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In light of the above, the main conclusion regarding the situation of pensions in the 
international environment would be that, even with a presumably good architecture, 
public schemes are suffering from high pressure on their financial structure. Their 
financing channels have not adapted to the new era, and are not flexible enough to deal 
with new demographic tendencies and a more volatile economy, in which changes occur 
faster and consequences are more dramatic. Accordingly, these systems are needed for a 
reform to insufflate a dose of flexibility in their Social Security institutions, aiming to 
increase pension entitlement. 
Among the several existing ways to build pension entitlement in states strongly dependent 
on public provisions, this work places the focus on shifting pension accumulation, from 
the first pillar to the second and third, and a bet for private sector development. These are 
the most differential issues between the two systems being analysed in further sections, 
the Dutch and the Spanish one. 
As it is mentioned previously, numerous reforms have been implemented not by a few 
countries to deal with financial sustainability concerns. However, social or political 
challenges could have been triggered by these measures, or could still emerge on all 
fronts. 
In line with this reasoning, further chapters assess the effectiveness of pension systems in 
terms of pension adequacy. Rather than evaluating technical aspects of structural 
elements, we seek to comprehend the effect that choosing one or other alternative, within 
our framework boundaries, has on real people’s financial well-being. We expect further 
work to answer questions that arose in this section such as if private involvement is the 
key answer to solve the sustainability issue and if it does not imply, at the same, a 
detriment of some population groups’ welfare. The crucial assumption is to evaluate if it 
is possible to reach everyone with a private system under a competition regime; always 
from a social perspective and bearing in mind that the sustainability objective should be 
achieved without harming anyone in the society. 
1.2. The case of Spain: a conservative-corporatist perspective 
The first pension system presented, treated as a benchmark for comparisons, is the one 
currently into effect in Spain. Spain represents the prototype of a conservative-corporatist 
welfare regime with an active regulative state securing a high degree of de-
commodification9. Obsession with market efficiency has never been preeminent, and the 
focus is placed on the granting of social rights. 
                                                
9 De-commodification describes a process when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market  
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In pension matters, this idiosyncrasy enhances regulatory competences to displace the 
market, resulting in marginal private insurance share (Ebbinghaus, 2006; Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mayer, 1997).  
1.2.1. Institutional framework in Spain 
The origin of social protection policies in Spain dates to 1883, with the creation of the 
Social Reforms Commission. This institution had the mission of improving the working-
class welfare through actions in social protection matters. After a few years, in 1900, the 
first social insurance was created, being this one, the trigger factor to the establishment 
of new insurances for specific purposes, such as unemployment or disability. 
However, the poor protection provided by public instruments led to the appearance of 
other mechanisms managed by insurance companies on a sector basis. Before long, 
discrimination in social protection conditions between different productive sectors, forced 
the government to implement a unique and integrated Social Security regime, enclosed in 
the General Social Security Law in 1966. Despite this allegory to egalitarianism, the 
reality was that social benefits were far from being adequate, as the law proved unable to 
adapt the previous structure to that time requirements.  
It was not until the approval of the Spanish Constitution, in 1978, that the Social Security 
became appropriately configured. The current system has its roots in article 41, from the 
Constitution, which stablishes that “the public powers must maintain a public regime of 
Social Security, for all citizens, that guarantees assistance and enough provisions to those 
in need, specially in unemployment situations. Complementary assistance and provisions 
are voluntary”. 
Taking into consideration the previously exposed facts, it is possible to argue that the 
Spanish pension system is relatively young, in comparison to the ones instituted in other 
countries. In the majority of Europe, modern Social Security systems were stablished 
between the 50s and the 60s, whereas in Spain it did not happened until late 70s. In 
consequence, it is hard to find nowadays individuals with complete working careers. This 
reality is an important issue to mention, since the replacement rate promised for an 
individual with a full career, remember 82,1%, will rarely be achieved by today’s retirees. 
Nevertheless, as time goes by, upcoming retirees will start having complete working 
careers, and the real replacement rate will converge to the 82,1%. This phenomenon 
represents a threat, in the mid-term, for Social Security pensions’ financing, in addition 
to the widespread ageing population and high unemployment rates in the national 
territory. 
Financial sustainability of pensions has always been into question since 1985, when the 
government approved the first reform to release the system from an incipient financial 
pressure, by tightening eligibility criteria. Despite these measures entailed a considerable 
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relief for the system’s financial situation, pensions kept rising and a call for a new reform 
did not take long to arrive. 
1.2.2. The Spanish first pillar: Social Security and the basic pension 
The current first pillar of pensions in Spain covers a set of contingencies related to 
retirement, death and disease. It has two fundamental modalities, a care modality and a 
contribution modality.  
On the one hand, the first one appeals to the principle of sufficiency, and benefits all 
individuals with income levels under a determined threshold. It is financed with general 
taxes and compensations are provided on a non-return basis. The non-contributory 
pension is paid to those individuals lacking sufficient resources for their subsistence, 
according to the corresponding legally stablished terms. Current legislation set the 
following conditions to be satisfied for accessing non-contributory pension payments: be 
over 65 years old, minimum of 10 years of residence in Spain with no interruptions, no 
access to contributory pensions, annual income below 5.164 euros and no other payments 
from complementary pensions. The pension perceived ranges from 92,23 to 368,9 euros 
per month, and depends exclusively on income from the economic unit, and the number 
of beneficiaries.  
On the other hand, contributory pensions are financed with both active employers and 
active employees’ contributions under a regime of intergenerational solidarity. This 
means current active cohorts’ contributions finance passive cohorts’ pensions. The 
benefit perceived, follows a DB scheme, and is calculated as a function of employment 
history, accounting for both years of contribution and contribution bases. This modality 
comprises contribution-based eligibility rules; a minimum of 15 years is stablished, 
together with a minimum and maximum pension.  
Figures 4 and 5 show how by contributing to Spanish Social Security for 15 years, 
benefits in retirement amount to 33,9% of average earnings10, 10 percentage points above 
the EU15 average. Furthermore, the minimum and the maximum pension is legally fixed, 
respectively, at 636,1 and 2.567,28 euros. 
Depending on the professional sector, there exists a general, or a special regime to follow. 
The justification of such division, involves special measures to be adapted for providing 
and adequate protection to particular sectors such as mining, sea workers or self-
employed. Regardless the system joined, contributions are mandatory for all workers, and 
are calculated as a percentage of the salary base.  
                                                
10 The government offers a complement for those workers who, even having contributed for more than 
15 years, its pension accrual is less than the minimum. 
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Figure 4: Contribution years required for minimum pension11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pensions at Glance, OECD (2015) 
Figure 5: Basic pension as percentage of average earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pensions at Glance, OECD (2015) 
                                                
11 Minimum pensions refer to either the minimum of a specific scheme or of all schemes combined. The 
benefit level can take into account other pension income.  
 
. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Years Minimum eligibility Full benefit
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
% of average earnings
 19 
In 2016, General Regime’s percentage was a 28,3% of employee’s salary, with a 
minimum and a maximum amount fixed proportionally to the maximum pension of 
43.704 euros per year. This wage ceiling prevents workers from incurring in contribution 
payments outside the monthly range of 216,33 and 1.067,4 euros. Last resort to mention 
regarding contributions is that, the self-employed can choose their preferred contribution 
base within a specific range. 
Taking into consideration both the contributory and the care modality, total expenditure 
of the public pension system in Spain amounted to 11,8% of GDP in 2013, slightly higher 
than the EU average of 10,5%. The non-contributory modality, together with 
complements for the minimum pension, represent, approximately, 1% of total Spanish 
GDP. The remaining, corresponds to contributory pensions, from which a 68% goes to 
retirement matters. Expenditure in contributory pensions increased by 3,1 percentage 
points in the period between 2007 and 2015, a fact that has led the system to reach a 
deficit of 1,5% of GDP in 2015.  
1.2.3. The Spanish second pillar: Company’s social insurance 
In some professional sectors, a social insurance is promoted through occupational pension 
plans from friendly societies or mutual funds. 
This second pillar includes those pension plans promoted by companies on a labour 
relationship basis, whose purpose is to encourage private savings for securing employees’ 
retirement. These schemes are DC with contributions’ amount generally chosen freely by 
the employee. In Spain, however, this sort of pension plans is not widespread, as hiring it 
does not release workers from the obligation to contribute to the general regime of Social 
Security.  
To illustrate this, according to INE, the total amount of capitalised funds from 
occupational pension plans accounted for 2,02 million euros, by the end of 2015, covering 
only a 3,3% of active workers. Expressed as a percentage of GDP, this 2,02 million 
represent a 3,38%, while the European average is placed around 14,9%. 
1.2.4. The Spanish third pillar: Investment 
The third pillar is comprised by all complementary insurance products, contracted 
voluntarily by individuals. As the second pillar, this third is also based on individual 
capitalization of savings (DC), and its plans are mainly offered by private pension funds 
and insurance companies. This third pillar enables individuals to increment their saving 
accounts, progressively on a long run basis. 
In view of a potential reduction in public pensions, the State is incentivising this sort of 
products by offering fiscal savings, up to a maximum, when contributions are realized. 
However, these products are still unpopular in Spain, due to the obligation to continue to 
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contribute to Social Security, and a set of drawbacks concerning hard taxes when 
recovering retirement investments, low returns and high commission fees. Experts 
estimate that, from the 600 private plans available in Spain, only 23% of them have 
certainly equalled inflation rates over the previous ten years of activity.  
Numbers show how private personal plans have an underlying value of 7,88 million euros, 
by the end of 2015, representing a 6,29% of Spanish GDP. If compared with the European 
average, the gap is even higher than in occupational plans, as the average percentage in 
the EU is around 21,7% for the same year. 
1.3. The Dutch case: a liberal perspective 
The counter party used in this work to make comparisons is the pension system stablished 
in the Netherlands. The Dutch alternative has been congratulated with a grade A in the 
Melbourne Mercer Global index, only surpassed by Denmark. This grading is translated 
into a fist class and robust retirement income system that delivers good benefits, is 
sustainable and has a high level of integrity.   
The regime in the Netherlands is considered a liberal welfare state, characterized by 
modest universal transfers and social plans, with its beneficiaries concentrated, mainly, 
among low-income individuals, working class and state dependents. Its idiosyncrasy 
limits the welfare state up to the point where marginal propensity to opt for welfare 
instead of work, is equal. Social rights still play a big role in individual’s life but the de-
commodification effect is small, giving priority to a fair, but a free market. 
1.3.1. Institutional framework in the Netherlands 
Public pensions were first stablished in the Netherlands in 1919. The funded scheme was 
characterized by a strong relation between contributions and benefits received in 
retirement. Pensions were guaranteed only for those workers over 65 years that surpassed 
a determined income threshold. The Dutch liberal thinking was strongly present in the 
roots of its pension system, but the lack of indexed pensions rapidly eroded the real value 
of retiree’s benefits, a phenomenon that immediately led to calls for a reform. To solve 
this shortcoming, the Dutch government developed, in 1956, a more efficient version of 
the system instituted in 1919, by introducing a compulsory pay-as-you-go old-age 
insurance for all residents. Under the 1956 scheme, pension benefits payable at age 65 
were not means tested, did not depend on previous contributions and were indexed to 
contractual wages. 
New reforms and increases in public pension benefit became frequent in the following 
decade but the most revealing fact of what is happening today in the Netherlands, is 
related to the rapid growth of occupational pensions after World War II. A wage policy 
that limited increments in salaries, triggered employers to compete in offering better 
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secondary conditions to hire good labour. Those conditions included occupational 
pensions, which were initially developed in the Netherlands as a contracting tool but, in 
front of the tremendous success of getting firms involved in their worker’s retirement, the 
government signed in 1949 the Occupational Pension Act (BFT). This law made the 
negotiated supplementary pension compulsory, for all firms in a particular sector, if 
requested by employers’ organizations and trade unions. This means that the 
Occupational Pension Act did not oblige contractually employers to contract pension 
schemes for their employees, but created the framework to negotiate these occupational 
pensions through industrial-relation agreements.   
Further reforms contributed to an increment in the popularity of occupational pensions 
by introducing fiscal allowances and incentives to make them more financially attractive.  
Despite its adequacy, the Dutch pension system has also suffered recent changes mostly 
driven by the widespread need to improve fiscal consolidation and financial sustainability 
of pensions. 
1.3.2. The Dutch first pillar: state old-age pension (AOW) 
The first pillar of the pension system in the Netherlands is managed by means of state 
regulations, and provides income to people over 65 years or after decease. In this first 
level, two forms of old-age provisions are involved: 
§ General Old-Age Pensions Act (AOW): This statutory (managed by Social 
Security) old-age pension, benefits all residents in the Netherlands aged 65 and 
over with a flat-rate positively correlated with years of residence12. 
§ Surviving Dependants Act (ANW): This type of pension is a flat-rate benefit 
payable to the surviving partner after both parents and the other partner die. 
Pension rights in the Netherlands regarding this first pillar were conceived to embrace all 
people aged 65 and over, and entitle them to full pension rights. Theoretically, everybody 
between 15 and 65 years, with residence in the Dutch territory is insured. This entitlement 
is accumulated at a rate of 2% for each year of insurance, which is translated into a 2% 
of the total AOW pension, for each year of residence in the Netherlands. The system is 
designed in a manner that if an individual stays his full hypothetical working life in the 
Netherlands, a yearly 2% will lead to 100% entitlement upon reaching the age of 65. We 
are in front of a case where eligibility rules are residence-based with full benefit around 
25% of average earnings, prorated to the number of years of residence. 
                                                
12 In principle the AOW pensions is conceived to guarantee a 70% of minimum wage 
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Figure 6: Years of residence or contribution required for basic pension13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pensions at Glance, OECD (2015) 
Figure 7: Basic pension as percentage of average earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pensions at Glance, OECD (2015) 
                                                
13 For the United Kingdom, the new state pension will require 35 years for the full benefit and 10 years for 
the minimum. 
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contributions. 
Basic pensions refer to the benefit paid based on either the length of residency or the duration of 
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Without regard to the nature of eligibility rules, there is huge heterogeneity among 
countries in the number of years required both for the full benefit and the minimum 
eligibility. Moreover, some countries like United Kingdom require a minimum number 
of years of both residence and contributions. Figure 6 displays clearly how, for instance, 
Nordic countries require around 40 years of residence for full benefit, while in others, like 
Australia and New Zealand, only 10 years are needed.   
Another determinant, in addition to eligibility rules, is the monetary value of benefits 
perceived. Controversially, Figure 7 evinces how countries with low profile eligibility 
rules like Australia, New Zealand or Greece, show considerably high benefit levels. The 
key to achieve this level of entitlement relies on the fact these countries do not prorate 
eligibility conditions and their pensions are means-tested. This means that, although it is 
relative easy to be elected, those individuals that do not surpass the eligibility threshold 
are left with no pension benefit at all. 
In short, the Netherlands embraces a system, which requires long stays to be elected for 
the full benefit, but minimum eligibility has no requirements at all.  
Beyond the heterogeneity in the eligibility criteria, the most remarkable fact, in 
comparison with the Spanish scheme, is that basic pensions benefits are flat-rates, based 
on residence years, whereas in Spain, a full minimum pension acts effectively as a top-up 
payment.  
The AOW flat-rate is applied to the net statutory minimum wage to calculate individual 
compensations. The amount of the benefit does not depend or any former labour 
relationship or contributions paid, housewives who never worked either paid 
contributions are also entitled, with minor differences depending on the retiree’s domestic 
situation. Assuming full entitlement, singles receive 70% of statutory minimum wage 
(1.001 euros) whereas couples (married or living together officially) get 50% of the 
statutory minimum wage (686 euros). Additionally, until 2015 a supplementary 
allowance was established for persons aged 65 with a partner under 65 with limited 
income. Those individuals received 90% of the net minimum wage (1.271 euros). 
Finally, as in many pay-as-you-go systems, the AOW is financed by contributions of 
current workers. The contribution rate is levied on salaries and statutory limited to a 
maximum of 18,25%. Once this contribution is not enough to cover all AOW-related 
expenses, the deficit is met with public purse.  
1.3.3. The Dutch second pillar: occupational pensions 
Occupational schemes are highly developed in the Netherlands, in part, thanks to 
collective sector agreements that guarantee quasi-mandatory coverage for more than 95% 
of total employees working in the country. These schemes serve to supplement the AOW 
pension and constitute the second pillar of the Dutch pension system. 
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Each year, employees, without regard to their age, sex or income; accrue equal pension 
rights amounting to a fixed percentage of their salary. These contributions are annually 
adjusted by wage or price indexation, and is employer the one responsible to deduct 
pension contributions from his employees’ salary, and transfer them to a pension 
provider. In fact, these payments are no more than a deferred salary to be received in 
retirement. Another point worth to mention is that an employer may also opt to have the 
pension scheme administered by an institution for occupational retirement provisions 
(IORP) with its seat abroad.  
The funding takes places through independent legal entities (industry pension funds, 
insurance companies, company-specific pension funds, etc.) whose objective is to exploit 
the potential of intergenerational risk sharing and protect beneficiaries’ rights. The system 
stablished in the Netherlands enables individuals, through their social partners, to decide 
which coverage level they prefer and which institution will administer their pension 
assets. In general, the content and nature of pension arrangements are agreed between the 
employer and the employee through a formal agreement.  
Occupational pensions schemes usually include an old-age pension, a partner pension, 
and a disability pension. Despite the nature of the pension fund, we encounter both 
defined benefit and defined contribution schemes, being the first ones the most popular 
among Dutch employees. In both cases, when retirement age is reached, those benefits 
can be converted into a single payment or an annuity. 
Regarding occupational contributions, a fixed percentage of earnings is generally fixed 
around a 16% of annual gross income. Solidarity is achieved by levying an average 
contribution: all members pay an equal percentage or an equal contribution to their 
pension provider, who invest these contributions until the retirement date. 
Occupational pensions together with AOW benefits constitute the main sources of income 
for Dutch retirees, amounting to 70%, on average, of their final pay.  
1.3.4. The Dutch third pillar: private pension provisions 
The Dutch pension system also includes private individual pensions, that provide income 
for old age through an annuity or a lump sum payment, encouraged by tax reliefs up to 
certain limits.  
Individuals may choose to supplement their pension via voluntary contributions to a 
private pension fund, generally offered by banks or insurance companies. These products 
might be thought as a tool to compensate a pension shortfall though an annuity payment 
for those unable to access other levels. Similar to the third pillar in Spain, contributions 
to private pension funds are deductible, although future money inflows will be taxed.  
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CHAPTER II. DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY  
Having a big picture of pension schemes’ functioning in both countries, this chapter 
entails the methodology employed to assess how life course patterns are related to 
financial well-being in retirement. All calculations were conducted using R statistical 
software (R Core Team, 2012), along with libraries TraMineR for the multi-channel 
sequence analysis (Gabadinho, et.al., 2011) and WeightedCluster for the cluster analysis 
(Studer, 2013). Own built scripts used in the analysis are found at:  
https://github.com/aleixfiblasalgado/TFG-ADE-2017. 
2.1. Data 
All data utilised is retrieved from the last release 6.0.0. of the Survey of Health, Aging, 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) (Börsch-Supan, 2017). This big database collects 
multidisciplinary and cross-national microdata on health, socio-economic status and 
social family networks of approximately 123.000 individuals. 
The SHARE target population are persons aged over 50 who have their regular domicile 
in countries participating in the survey14, excluding incarcerated, hospitalised, out of the 
country for the entire survey period, or those unable to speak the country’s language(s). 
Therefore, release 6.0.0. which was collected between 2016-2017, selects individuals 
born in 1966 or earlier. 
Data collection is based on a probability sample and computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI). Interviewers conduct face-to-face interviews using a laptop in 
which the CAPI system is installed, being in this way able to shed light on respondents’ 
doubts during the survey.  SHARE applies a concept of ex-ante harmonisation: a common 
generic questionnaire is translated into national languages with the aim of easing data 
comparison across countries15.  
Precisely, among all waves available, we use data from wave 1 (Börsch-Supan 2017, 
Börsch-Supan et. al., 2005; Börsch-Supan and Jürges, 2005; Börsch-Supan et.al., 2013), 
wave 2 (Börsch-Supan, 2017; Börsch-Supan et.al., 2008; Börsch-Supan et.al., 2013), 
wave 5 (Börsch-Supan, 2017; Börsch-Supan et.al., 2015; Malter and Börsch-Supan, 
2015; Börsch-Supan et.al., 2013) and SHARELIFE (Börsch-Supan, 2017; Börsch-Supan 
                                                
14 Countries currently enrolled in the survey are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. 
15 Despite this harmonization, there are some variables that require country-specific measurements as their 
indicators differ in form (ISCED, ISCO or NACE codes). SHARE release guide 6.0.0. and further specific 
wave documentation provides the necessary metadata to deal with this issue of ex-post harmonisation. 
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et.al., 2011, Schröder, 2011; Börsch-Supan et.al. 2013), the third wave of data collection 
for SHARE. 
Waves 1, 2 and 5 are of similar nature, they both contain current information about 
retirees’ health and socio-economic conditions. On the contrary, wave 3 (SHARELIFE) 
focuses on life history data, and most of the information collected concerns life 
circumstances. This survey is done on a specific basis with the aim to link individual’s 
microdata, over the respondent’s entire life, with institutional macro data about the 
welfare state. This study complements the SHARE panel by providing historical data to 
enhance our understanding about how different events, throughout individuals’ life, 
influence their situation in old age.  
To the purpose of this work, SHARELIFE data is used to compare specific birth cohorts 
in the two countries of study, in order to examine the social context in which these 
individuals experienced their life courses and retirement. It is important to draw attention 
to the inter-temporal combination of social policies across individual’s life course, as 
those that affect them during their adult’s life might differ a lot from the ones into effect 
when these cohorts retire. To deal with this issue, we have selected the cohorts born 
between 1930 and 1960, from the whole sample of Dutch and Spanish individuals. 
Despite some differences, this sample design enables us to compare the trajectories of the 
cohorts selected on a similar basis, as social environments across individual’s life courses 
do not differ too much. The bottom line is to have, within our selected data, the less 
“noise” as possible, avoiding different life course patterns derived from a changing social 
context. Ideally, the only differential point should be the pension system to which these 
cohorts are entitled. 
2.2. Variables 
When accessing SHARE data, each wave is broken into different datasets covering all 
topics related with the study. At the same time, each of these datasets contains a large list 
of variables, including an individual id for merging operations. To work with such amount 
of data, it is extremely important to pay attention to all data documentation, the SHARE 
release guide and the questionnaires in each wave, in order to be clear on the variables 
meaning, because many times variable names are not enough for knowing precisely what 
a variable might represent.  
Having said this, next step concerns presenting our variable selection proposal, for both 
the multi-channel sequence, and the regression analysis. 
2.2.1. Joint family-work trajectories 
Employment and family trajectories have been used as indicators of individuals’ life 
behaviour. Variables within these dimensions come into play in multi-channel sequence 
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analysis when building family-work sequences. They are all measured as longitudinal 
sequences in yearly intervals from ages 15 to 65.  
Family variables are found, in both the partner, and the retrospective children section of 
SHARELIFE dataset. Regarding the partner section, the variables selected are the 
following ones: (i) year married, (ii) year of death partner and (iii) year of divorce16. 
They are used in multi-channel sequence analysis to represent, on a year basis, whether 
the individual is “single”, “married”, “widowed” or “divorced”. Furthermore, still 
concerning family trajectories, information in the retrospective children section has also 
been selected. In this case, the sought variable is the year when individual’s first, second 
and subsequent child was born. These two dimensions are combined into a single state to 
construct individual family trajectories. 
In addition to the family side, it is necessary to include information concerning working 
careers if we aim to build complete life trajectories. Variables representing employment 
courses are found in the work history section of the SHARELIFE dataset. In this case, 
work trajectories are broadly specified, on a three-state basis:  
§ (1) “out of the labour force”: includes people not currently working such as 
students, homemakers, disabled people and unemployed. 
§ (2) “full time work”: includes employed, civil servants and self-employed 
working full time. 
§ (3) “part time work”: includes all forms of self-reported part-time work. 
To construct yearly working states based on the previous criteria, the following variables, 
from SHARELIFE dataset, need to be selected: (i) year started job, (ii) full or part time, 
(iii) when changed to part-time, (iv) when changed to full-time and (v) year stopped job. 
Resulting joint family-work trajectories are enriched, with both academic, and 
demographic information encompassed in the demographics and isced modules from 
SHARE project’s wave 1. The variables chosen are: (i) isced 1997 codes showing the 
level of education attained, (ii) gender and (iii) nationality.  
2.2.2. Financial well-being in retirement 
As indicators of retiree’s financial well-being, we mainly consider both individual 
pension income, and assets. The imputations module, from SHARE waves 1, 2 and 5, 
aggregates retiree’s income data by income source, and is an optimal starting point to 
construct new variables with even a higher level of aggregation. 
                                                
16 All of them might include more than one year accounting for the occurrence of these events (i.e. 
individuals who married two times) 
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The three waves are selected because each of their imputations module aggregates 
individual responses in a different manner. Therefore, depending on the variable 
demanded, one or another module would be required for its construction. In addition to 
differences in wave’s imputed variables, the form of pension provisions differs a lot from 
one country to another. In consequence, a variable representing an income source would 
rarely be comparable across countries, and it will be necessary, as in this case, to figure 
out homologous sources by looking at the questionnaire and metadata that accompany 
each wave. 
Subsequently, we present the list of variables used as indicators of financial well-being: 
§ Public: This variable represents the net annual sum of income received from 
public sources. It includes annual old age, early retirement pension, survivor and 
war pension, disability pension, sickness benefits and pension, and compensations 
received from social assistance17. 
§ Occupational: This variable accounts for all kinds of annual net private 
occupational pensions18. 
§ Private: Variable “private” corresponds to life insurance payments, private 
annuity personal pension plans, and long-term care insurances from private 
insurance companies; all of them after taxes.19 
§ Alimony: Includes income received from alimony and charities20. 
§ Hnfass: Household net financial assets (financial assets – financial liabilities). 
§ Ysrent: Annual income from rent or sublet. 
§ Hrass: Household real assets. 
§ Ybabsmf: Annual interest/dividend from bank account, bond stock and mutual 
funds. 
§ Yaohm: Annual income from other household members. 
                                                
17 For Spanish cohorts, variable public is the sum of variables ypen1, ypen3 ypen6 from wave 1 imputations 
module. 
For Dutch cohorts, variable public is the sum of variables ypen1, ypen3 and ypen5 from wave 1 imputations 
module. 
18 For both Spanish and Dutch cohorts, variable occupational is the sum of variables ypen2 in wave 1 
imputations module, ypen2 in wave 2 imputations module and all ep_ from the 11th to the 14th in the 
earnings module. 
19 For both Spanish and Dutch cohorts, variable “private” corresponds to variable yreg1 in wave 1 
imputations module. 
20 For both Spanish and Dutch cohorts, variable alimony corresponds to variable yreg2 in wave 1 
imputations module. 
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While the first four variables are handy built according to each one’s reference, others are 
available at SHARE imputations module from one of the three waves introduced in the 
beginning of the section21.  
In addition to previously stated indicators, generally used as dependent variables in 
regression analysis, we have selected additional information available at SHARE to 
enrich the list of independent variables. Complements include: (i) political orientation22, 
(ii) years of education, (iii) years of education of partner and (iv) share of own business.  
2.3. Multi-channel sequence analysis 
Firstly, to categorize groups of individuals with similar family-work trajectories we use 
multi-channel sequence analysis (MCSA) (Gauthier et.al., 2010; Pollock, 2007), a 
recently developed extension of classical sequence analysis (SA).  
Sequence analysis is a technique used to classify sequences of categorical states. It was 
originally developed in biology for identifying similarities between the very first 
sequences of the insulin protein. Initial approaches to the method were characterized by 
the work of Fred Sanger, and his colleagues, in an intend to understand the function of 
molecules and, subsequently sequence the first DNA-based genome.  
At first glance, deciding that two biological sequences are similar is no different from 
evaluating similarities between two text strings. In its broader definition, a sequence is 
nothing more than a unidimensional ordered list of elements. Besides its applications in 
biology, sequence analysis proved to be extremely useful in social science, as many times 
these disciplines are interested in studying series of events. Marketing researchers might 
be interested in consumption patterns, sociologists may analyse behaviours, or even 
economists could serve from this methodology to study the evolution of macroeconomic 
indicators (Abbot, 1995). Despite the nature of the sequence considered, relationships 
between character strings are discovered by aligning them together and analysing changes 
under some defined scoring scheme.  
In this work, the sequence employed concerns life trajectories of individuals, providing a 
double perspective by including both family and work events to determine similarities in 
individual’s lifestyles. 
As it is said in previous sections, various empirical studies emphasize the 
multidimensionality of life trajectories in social studies (Elder, 1985; Kohli, 1986; Levy 
& Widmer, 2013; Giele & Holst, 2003; Heinz and Marshall, 2003; Mortimer and 
Shanahan, 2003; Macmillan, 2005). Ideally, life course studies would require the 
                                                
21 See SHARE release guide to find which wave contains each variable. 
22 Political orientation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 and 10 represent, respectively, left-
wing and right-wing political party. 
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integration of all life dimensions in a unique empirical model for identifying homologous 
trajectories. Nevertheless, due to the impossibility to process all data available at SHARE, 
we have selected life aspects ought to be more influent in retirement outcomes. Precisely, 
to build family-work trajectories, the dimensions selected concern children events and 
partner status for the family side, and employment trajectories regarding working careers. 
Optimal matching in sequence analysis proved to be successful in identifying 
homologous life trajectories but has neglected the multidimensionality of such tracks. 
Therefore, we account for an approach in with these multiple life dimensions are taken 
into consideration. To fill this gap, Gauthier et. al., 2014 purpose multi-channel sequence 
analysis, a methodology which makes practical improvements to sequential analysis and 
allows optimal matching in more than one dimension. 
The multi-channel sequence analysis presented systematizes approaches for dealing with 
multidimensionality by using optimal matching through parallel processes occurring in 
all life spheres considered. Translated into this study, two character strings of family-
work trajectories will be considered homologous only if they are composed of similar 
events in the two domains, and if those events occur at close time-points along the life of 
the individual.  
Figure 8 displays an example of how family-work sequences within our sample of 
Spanish and Dutch individuals look like.  
Figure 8: Fictitious example of family-work sequences for 5 individuals23 
Individual/Age 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Arturo snc snc snc snc mnc m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m2c 
Sandra snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc mnc mnc 
Thomas snc snc snc snc snc snc mnc mnc mnc m1c m1c 
Ben snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc 
Diana snc snc snc snc snc snc mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc 
Individual/Age 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Arturo m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c 
Sandra mnc m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c d1c d1c d1c d1c 
Thomas m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c 
Ben snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc 
Diana mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc mnc m1c m1c 
Individual/Age 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
Arturo m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c w2c w2c 
Sandra d1c d1c d1c d1c d1c d1c d1c d1c m1c m1c m1c 
Thomas m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c m2c 
Ben snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc snc 
Diana m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c m1c 
                                                
23 First figure is related with family events while the second concerns working trajectories. 
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Individual/Age 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Arturo olf olf olf olf olf ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Sandra pt pt pt pt ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Thomas ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Ben olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf ft ft 
Diana olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf 
Individual/Age 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Arturo ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Sandra ft olf olf olf olf olf olf olf pt pt pt 
Thomas ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft olf 
Ben ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Diana olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf 
Individual/Age 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 
Arturo ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft pt pt pt 
Sandra ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Thomas olf olf olf pt pt pt pt pt pt pt pt 
Ben ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft 
Diana olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf olf 
 
Family Work 
“s”: single “nc”: no children “olf”: out of the labour force 
“m”: married “1c”: 1 children “ft”: full-time employed 
“w”: widowed “2c”: 2 or more 
children24 
“pt”: part-time employed 
“d”: divorced 
Source: Own elaboration 
This fictitious example displays the life trajectories of 4 individuals. Arturo and Thomas 
got married in their middle twenties and they both had 2 or more children during their 
respective adult’s life, with the difference that Arturo was widowed at the age of 51. 
Sandra left his job when married but started working again when divorced. Ben is the 
example of an individual who both married and started working lately. Finally, Diana is 
a person who never worked and got married also in her middle twenties. 
Once character strings representing family-work trajectories for each individual are 
available, we run MCSA across our sample to first quantify, the distance between 
individual sequences within the two domains. The output of this first step is a pairwise 
distance matrix summarizing the mentioned distance between two-dimensional family-
work sequences.  
There are several ways to compute this pairwise distance between sequences (Aisenbrey 
& Fasang, 2010; MacIndoe & Abbott, 2004; Madero-Cabib, Gauthier, & Le Goff, 2016). 
                                                
24 We consider differences in the number of children from the second onwards have little impact on 
financial well-being in retirement. Thus, third and subsequent children are included in category “2c”. 
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In this case, we appeal to the Dynamic Hamming Distance (Lesnard, 2006; Lesnard, 
2010) which puts special emphasis on similarities in terms of timing.  
To further identification of cluster groups that represent similar life course trajectories, it 
is first needed to determine the most appropriate number of clusters. To achieve this 
objective, we serve from different cluster cut-off criteria and, with the help of 
WeightedCluster package in R (Studer and Matthias, 2013) we build Figures 9, 10 and 
11 in Appendix 1, showing values for a range of quality measures under different number 
of clusters. Additionally, Table 3 describes each quality measure, together with its 
possible range of values and a criteria min/max, proportional to cluster’s quality. 
It is usually easier to detect the optimal number of clusters by standardizing scores. For 
this reason, we also include Figures 12, 13 and 14 representing standardized values of the 
three previous plots. An interesting remark is that the optimal number of clusters, taking 
into consideration only family and work spheres separately, is placed around 4 for both 
dimensions (Figures 12 and 13). Conversely, if joint states are considered, the optimal 
seems to be higher; a logical result bearing in mind that the combination of both aspects 
leads to more dissimilar life course sequences. 
In selecting the number of clusters, our aim is to choose the one in which more measures 
coincide to be the optimum. Accordingly, results suggest eight clusters as the best 
grouping.   
This number is used in Figure 15 where eight groups of family-work trajectories are 
illustrated as state distribution graphs (Gabadinho et.al., 2011). Trajectories displayed 
comprehend the entire adult’s life (from 15 to 65 years old) and show the proportion of 
individuals in a determined sequence state within each cluster. Different colours are 
assigned to clearly identify every categorical state from family and work dimensions (see 
legend). These joint work and family trajectories exhibited go beyond single indicators in 
the two domains and successfully display the life course outcomes of two similar 
contexts. 
Once every individual is properly assigned a cluster, it is recommended to conduct 
descriptive analysis for identifying each group’s characteristics. The dimensions 
evaluated do not have to be the constitutive elements used in the grouping process. On 
the contrary, it is possible to introduce other variables for describing each cluster such as 
gender, average years of education, nationality etc. The objective is to define more 
precisely cluster profiles. Ultimately, we pursue to identify the typical family-work 
trajectories in both countries by looking at the cluster containing more nationals25. 
                                                
25 Ideally, the typical family-work trajectory in each country should be identified by looking at population 
data. However, due to limitations in population data access we assume that sample strata composition 
reflects truthfully family-work trajectories in the population. 
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Subsequently, our descriptive analysis on eight clusters from Figure 15 is presented. The 
variables generated in Table 4 are summary statistics within strata defined by the cluster 
belonging26.  
§ (1) Cluster 1 is the third largest in size accounting for a 10,46% of the sample. 
Dutch women are the majority, but the gap with men or Spaniards is not 
excessively large, resulting an equitably distributed cluster in terms of gender and 
nationality. Despite a high proportion of individuals in first education levels, the 
number having finished tertiary education is slightly higher than in other clusters. 
Furthermore, full-time jobs are the mainstream, specially in early life stages, but 
years out of the labour force and part-time employment become more visible in 
mature ages. This fact is correlated with family trajectories as the norm for the 
most is one child, accompanied by “married” status; both events taking place in 
the same years where working interruptions occur. 
§ (2) Cluster 2 is the largest in size for both countries with a relative weight in the 
sample of 38,5%. It is not irrational that the most widespread life trajectory is the 
same in both societies, as they share a similar cultural context. Spanish 
predominate in this cluster, characterized by long full-time employment periods 
representing, on average, 41 years of individual’s life. Part-time jobs are almost 
inexistent and years not working are concentrated in early and later life stages. 
Regarding family events, the majority married at middle twenties and had two or 
more children immediately after. Therefore, we are in front of complete working 
careers (no interruptions) for individuals coming from all education levels. Last 
point worth mentioning concerns gender discrimination, a reality in this cluster as 
men represent almost 80% of individuals.  
§ (3) Cluster 3 goes immediately after Cluster 1 in terms of size, and both cluster’s 
composition is similar in many aspects such as education, employment trajectories 
or marriage timing. The main difference, and most representative characteristic of 
Cluster 3 is the absence of children. Comparing both countries, the majority of 
individuals married with no children is clearly from the Netherlands.  
                                                
26 Missing values in education variables have been ignored, then the sum of individuals with education data 
available does not match the total in the cluster. 
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Figure 15: Eight clusters of family-work trajectories in Spain and the Netherlands27 
 
                                                
27 The work trajectories are displayed on the right side, whereas the corresponding family life courses are 
placed on the left-hand side. 
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Table 4: Descriptive analysis on eight clusters of family-work trajectories 
Cluster (#) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Number of individuals 393 1447 316 276 926 214 115 70 
Men (%) 0,453 0,794 0,443 0,080 0,037 0,589 0,374 0,371 
Women (%) 0,547 0,206 0,557 0,920 0,963 0,411 0,626 0,629 
Nationality 
Spanish (# of individuals) 179 788 118 31 506 121 17 13 
Dutch (# of individuals) 214 659 198 245 420 93 98 57 
Spanish (%) 0,455 0,546 0,373 0,112 0,546 0,565 0,148 0,186 
Dutch (%) 0,546 0,455 0,626 0,887 0,454 0,435 0,852 0,814 
Education28 
Isced level 1 (1997) 62 254 41 18 193 38 10 6 
Isced_level 2(1997) 83 221 66 80 240 32 28 20 
Isced level 3 (1997) 47 182 32 39 85 26 15 9 
Isced level 4 (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Isced level 5 (1997) 46 188 40 43 36 25 23 9 
Isced level 6 (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Still school 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Other 1 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 
Employment state, mean duration in years 
Out of the labour force 18,40 9,18 18,32 15,87 42,89 15,97 20,92 23,40 
Part-time employed 3,98 0,28 3,83 25,48 2,24 2,64 5,47 4,13 
Full-time employed 28,62 41,54 28,85 9,65 5,87 32,39 24,61 23,47 
Family state, mean duration in years 
Single no children 11,20 10,14 12,44 8,30 8,08 50,57 8,09 10,50 
Single one children 2,64 0,07 0,02 0,06 0,06 0,00 0,08 2,74 
Single two or more children 0,01 0,06 0,02 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,03 37,37 
Married no children 3,87 1,90 37,12 2,36 1,79 0,37 2,20 0,00 
Married one children 28,26 3,04 0,01 2,67 3,07 0,00 2,75 0,00 
Married two or more children 0,01 35,00 0,16 37,18 36,58 0,00 13,83 0,39 
Widowed no children 0,07 0,02 0,69 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,03 0,00 
Widowed one children 1,15 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Widowed two or more children 0,00 0,49 0,00 0,14 1,17 0,00 0,04 0,00 
Divorced no children 1,55 0,03 0,54 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,16 0,00 
Divorced one children 2,24 0,04 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,29 0,00 
Divorced two or more children 0,00 0,21 0,00 0,25 0,15 0,00 23,51 0,00 
Source: Own elaboration 
                                                
28 Education levels are represented in terms of isced codes to facilitate country comparison. The 
correspondent education level to each code can be found at 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/isced97-en.pdf 
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§ (4) Cluster 4 is small in size and almost entirely comprised by Dutch women. It 
represents individuals who changed to part-time positions at fatherhood or 
motherhood. The mainstream for families are early marriages and two or more 
children that coincide in time with many transitions from full to part time 
employment, being the last the predominant working status (more years working 
part time on average) for people in this cluster. We also appreciate gender 
disparities in Cluster 4 as women are the predominant group incurring in 
employment interruptions for childcare, whereas men continue working. 
§  (5) Cluster 5 is the second largest in size and represents people who rarely worked 
ever, or started full-time jobs but left as soon as they marry and had the first child. 
Gender discrimination becomes evident in this group as 96% of persons who 
never worked or left it for childcare are women, predominantly from Spain. 
Family trajectories are similar to those in Clusters 2 and 4; people got married in 
their middle twenties and had two or more children. The main difference to 
highlight, specially with Cluster 2, is that while men have almost complete 
working careers, women experienced most of their supposedly working years out 
of the labour force. Furthermore, education is concentrated in low levels, a 
phenomenon endorsing the fact that men had easier access to both education and 
labour markets. 
§ (6) Cluster 6 is the third in size, starting from the bottom. Spanish men are slightly 
predominant, and individuals show a typical working career, being full-time 
employment the mainstream. The big difference with other clusters and most 
representative characteristic of individuals in this cluster is that they never neither 
got married nor had children. Consequently, the most common family status with 
an average mean duration of 50 years is “single no children”. 
§ (7) Cluster 7 is the penultimate in terms of size, comprised by a clear majority of 
Dutch women. Divorces are the most differential issue in this group together with 
a working trajectory that remains constant all along the period of analysis. The 
most common working state is “full-time employed” although others are 
substantially elevated, specially as individuals get close to retirement. 
§ (8) Last cluster is the smallest in size and contains individuals who never married 
but had children (the majority had two or more). As in Cluster 7, most of them are 
women from the Netherlands concentrated in low education levels. Working 
careers are unsteady, with “full-time employed” and “out of the labour force” 
categories showing a similar number of years on average. 
Notably, Cluster 2 is the largest in number of nationals for both countries and, 
accordingly, presumed to encompass the “traditional” life trajectories in the two states. 
Nevertheless, results in Table 4 also evince that life courses are strongly gendered thus, 
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it might be erroneous to consider as the norm, a cluster with such a large gender 
disproportion.  
In line with previous argument, on the one hand, gender discrimination is not a big deal 
in determining the “traditional” family trajectory. The pattern regarding family 
occurrences is similar in the two biggest clusters and shared by both Spanish and Dutch 
individuals. Results suggest “married with two or more children” as the predominant 
status, being middle twenties the average age for marrying and the year after marriage 
when first children born. 
However, on the other hand, disparities arise when turning to employment trajectories. 
Clusters with more than 50 percent men are characterized by full-time employment 
(Cluster 2) whereas in clusters of more than 90 percent women the ‘traditional’ family 
trajectory is coupled with extended periods out of the labour force (Cluster 5) or with 
part-time work (Cluster 4). 
It is crucial not to forget this gender discrimination because in further procedures the 
emphasis would not be only placed in trajectories from Cluster 2, but also Clusters 4 and 
5 should be taken into account. If not, we might incur in the mistake of considering 
measures only in men’s benefit while forgetting about the big collectives of women in 
Clusters 4 and 5. 
In conclusion, both societies are characterized by strong male breadwinner contexts 
during the years which our study cohorts experienced their work and family formation. 
Furthermore, instead of one standard life trajectory, the mentioned context promotes two 
ideal-typical gendered life-courses. On the one hand, male life courses correspond to the 
tripartite model proposed by Kohli and Meyer (1986), i.e. access to education, then full-
time employment in continuous occupational careers, and retirement. On the other hand, 
female life courses are characterised by poor education, then full-time work in early life 
stages, but as soon as they marry and enter motherhood, they tend to leave the labour 
market, and then rarely return to work, or return mainly in part-time positions (Levy & 
Widmer, 2013).  
2.4. Regression analysis 
The second step in the analysis estimates whether same family-work trajectories in both 
countries lead to different retirement outcomes. The characterization of life course 
patterns is attained in previous section, by conducting multi-channel sequence analysis 
on our study cohorts. Subsequently, we employ regression analysis to interact family-
work clusters in the form of dummies with variables representing financial well-being in 
retirement.  
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Multiple regression models allow to explicitly control for many factors that 
simultaneously affect the dependent variable, in this case indicators of financial well-
being in retirement. Relevant information about family-work trajectories is captured by 
binary variables, accounting for individual’s belonging to previously built clusters. 
Additionally, more regressors are included in the model, representing other life spheres 
presumably related to financial well-being such as political orientation, education level, 
gender or business ownership. 
Before estimating regression parameters through ordinary least squares (OLS) it is 
required to adjust models for incorporating binary information. Including as many 
dummies as categories in a factor variable would introduce perfect collinearity (cluster1i 
+ cluster2i + cluster3i + cluster4i + cluster5i + + cluster6i + cluster7i + cluster8i = 1), which 
means, in this example, that each variable clusteri is a perfect linear combination of the 
others. This is colloquially known as the dummy trap and, to avoid it, we are required to 
determine a benchmark or base group, for each dummy, that is the group against which 
comparisons are made. The reference group is not included in the model, being the 
intercept its expected value, and other dummy coefficients the differential effect in 
intercepts between each category. 
Regarding models included in this section, we are required to define base categories for 
both binary variables “gender” and “cluster”. As a matter of fact, to ease comparisons, 
the reference group set are men belonging to cluster 2, which could be interpreted as the 
traditional life course for men in both countries. In consequence, the generic model is 
defined as: 𝑌" = 	𝛼 +	𝛾(𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒" + 𝛾.𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1" + 𝛾5𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟3" + 𝛾7𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟4" + 𝛾9𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟5"+ 𝛾;𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟6" + 𝛾=𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟7" + 𝛾?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟8" + 𝛽(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠" + 𝛽.𝑒𝑑𝑢"+ 𝛽5𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠" + 𝛽7𝑒𝑑𝑢2" + 𝑒", 
in which 𝑌" is an indicator of financial well-being in retirement, 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒" is a binary 
variable that indicates individual’s gender, 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑋" accounts for cluster’s belonging, 
and remaining variables are of quantitative nature corresponding to (i) political 
orientation29, (ii) years of education, (iii) share of own business and (iv) years of 
education of partner; previously defined in section 2.2. 
Appendixes 2 to 8 display regression results for different indicators of financial wealth in 
retirement. The dataset has been split by nationality, although is possible to encode it as 
a dummy, for having more visually attractive results and enable immediate comparisons 
between two pension systems. 
                                                
29 Political orientation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 and 10 represent, respectively, left-
wing and right-wing political party. 
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Appendixes are structured by means of different financial well-off indicators. Two big 
categories are distinguished: 
§ Appendixes 2 to 7, in which financial well-being is assessed through both 
individual and household annual pension payments30. 
§ Appendix 8 and 9, in which financial well-being is assessed through individual 
and household net wealth at retirement. 
Overall, findings support greater pension penalties for typical female life courses in the 
liberal Dutch pension system. Furthermore, as expected, women tend to have lower 
pension income than men, around 1.500 euros, irrespective of their family-work 
trajectories. 
The first thing that calls our attention about total pension income in both countries 
(Appendixes 2 and 3), is that Dutch pensions amount two times the ones in Spain. 
Someone might initially appeal to differences in standards of living to account for this 
gap. However, while the median equivalised disposable income31 is 1,57 times higher in 
the Netherlands (Eurostat Statistical Books, 2014), our results evince that this proportion 
is not maintained for retirees’ pension payments. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue 
that the pension system in the Netherlands provides Dutch retirees with a higher 
purchasing power in comparison to the one instituted in Spain.  
Other relevant covariates evince that the highest penalty is held by those individuals that 
experienced extended periods out of the labour force (cluster 5), being this drawback 
higher in the Netherlands. Furthermore, still concerning cluster’s belonging, the most 
benefited group in the Netherlands are singles, regardless of whether they had children or 
not, whereas in Spain, the current scheme offers higher well-off conditions to those that 
had no children, regardless they civil status. 
Regarding other variables not involved into family-work trajectories, results reveal that 
education is more imperative in the Netherlands. On average, the marginal benefit, 
reflected in individual’s pensions, from an additional year of education is 230,69 euros 
per year in the Netherlands, whereas in Spain, the same extra year increases annual 
pension payments, by only 117,68 euros. The “politics” variable (remember encoded as 
a 0 to 10 scale) show how in Spain rightist sympathisers own higher pensions, while in 
the Netherlands, the situation is just the opposite.  
                                                
30 The amount considered represents after-tax pension payments. 
31 Total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, that is available for spending or saving, 
divided by the number of household members converted into equalised adults; household members are 
equalised or made equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the so-called 
modified OECD equivalence scale. 
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The previously mentioned differences are also reflected in household income, with the 
exception that, in the Netherlands, female part-time jobs are sufficiently awarded to 
enable women, who followed this pathway, to contribute to household income. On the 
contrary, in Spain, those part-time workers have little pension benefits. 
In addition to total income, we have also computed regressions on specific sources, 
aiming to highlight the effects of each separately and analyse their relative importance in 
both pension schemes.  
Results noticeably support descriptions provided in chapter I. Public pensions represent 
the main sustain for Spanish retirees, whereas in the Netherlands, they account for less 
than half of total income perceived in retirement. Conversely, occupational pensions, 
marginal in Spain, are the largest in size for Dutch retirees. Ultimately, private personal 
plans are still marginal in both countries, although there are some interesting points to 
remark. 
Focusing now on public pensions, regression outcomes in Appendix 4 demonstrate how 
this instrument enhances gender equality in both countries. This phenomenon is better 
appreciated in the Netherlands, as public pensions are residence-based, but the “female” 
covariate for Spanish retiree’s, is also lower than the one resulting from regressions on 
total income. The absence of children is again the best status for having higher retirement 
payments, and women in cluster 5 still bear the greatest part of the pain, but in a lower 
proportion. Another interesting point to remark is that education does not contribute to 
higher public pensions in neither Spain, nor the Netherlands. 
Turning to occupational pensions, the most important revealing fact is that these plans are 
the major cause of inequality among Dutch retirees. Individuals in cluster 5, who 
experienced extended periods out of the labour force, are, understandably, the most 
harmed. Differences between the educated and the non-educated population are also more 
visible in occupational pensions from both countries, being the Netherlands the one where 
this factor is more critical. 
There is nothing much to say about private pensions, as they account for little portion of 
retirees’ income, in both countries. Nevertheless, a relevant fact is persons in cluster 5, 
remember mostly women, are the most benefited from this income source. There is no 
information available about the contributor but, even in the case that relatives are the ones 
contributing to these individuals’ private pension plans, they are good tool for those who 
cannot access other levels. 
Ultimately, the two last Appendixes consider, as an indicator of well-being, total assets 
accumulated at retirement. In general, results, for both individuals and households, evince 
that the patrimony is not that related to family-work trajectories, but to other factors such 
as education, political orientation or share of own business. These complementary 
variables are more significant in predicting retirees’ net wealth, specially in the 
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Netherlands. A curious phenomenon in Spain is that the lowest individual patrimonies 
are found among cluster 5 individuals but, aggregating all household members’ wealth, 
the same individuals are placed among the ones with highest net wealth. Therefore, this 
result might be a sign that, among Spanish well-off families, it is more common that 
women do not work. Finally, as it previously suggested, high inequality is found among 
Dutch retiree’s net wealth. In line with the principles of a liberal welfare state, education 
level, political orientation or share of own business play a greater role in determining 
retirees’ net wealth and, consequently, results are more extreme, in comparison to a 
conservative welfare state such as the Spanish one.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The extent to which different pension alternatives can secure retirees is extremely 
important, in view of aging populations and low employment rates among older workers. 
With our analysis on SHARE data, we have compared how the liberal Dutch and the 
conservative Spanish system have differentially rewarded or penalized life courses of 
their respective retirees.  
Overall, findings show how the standard family profile of married with two children is 
not rewarded with the highest benefit in neither Spain, nor the Netherlands. Thence, both 
pension systems fail in providing the highest protection levels to typical family-work 
trajectories. Furthermore, penalties are particularly hard for typical female life courses in 
cluster 5, being these drawbacks stronger in the Netherlands.  
Despite this mentioned drawback, the Dutch pension system proved to provide higher 
absolute benefits in comparison to the Spanish one. Dutch retirees have a higher 
purchasing power, in part, due to the lack of salary ceilings in their occupational quotes. 
Eliminating, or at least increasing, the legally fixed range for contributions is highly 
recommended in Spain, as it will enable pensions’ growth to depend exclusively on 
nominal salaries, for all earning levels. This measure achieves higher intergenerational 
transfers, preventing, at the same time, modifications in the contribution rate32.  
Not losing sight of individuals in cluster 5, results also evince that the presence of children 
is an important detriment of pensions in Spain. Besides the reality that, irrespective to 
gender, having 2 or more children is the typical conduct for cohorts in both countries, it 
appears controversial to benefit more individuals with no children, when at the same time 
population ageing is probably the highest threat for pension schemes’ in the midterm. 
Without forgetting about possible higher pension complements for the economic unit, in 
the presence of children, in the long-term, however, equalizing the capacity of individuals 
with children to accrue pensions independently, through employment, is a more 
sustainable strategy. This fact is also a reality in the Netherlands, especially harmful for 
divorced individuals, but softer penalties are set on absence of children coupled with 
stable marriage. 
Previous argument, reinforces the hypothesis that working interruptions are extremely 
damaging, and new reforms are needed to narrow this gap. A good idea concerns enabling 
part-time workers to contribute to household pension income to a major extent, in addition 
to pension recognition of family care. Those measures have been deeply rooted in the 
Netherlands but not in Spain yet. Access to pension benefits in part-time or temporary 
                                                
32 The current 28,3% contribution rate is presumed high and modifying it might trigger distortions in the 
labour market. 
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jobs will become crucial in the future, as globalization is moving us towards a more 
interconnected and volatile economy, where previously common long working careers in 
the same firm, will be unusual. Therefore, Spanish authorities should set new reforms to 
adapt the current scenario to a more flexible organization of labour. 
Another point worth to mention is that the first pillar in the Netherlands, proved to be the 
most optimal to promote gender egalitarianism. Non-contributory pensions in Spain are 
still marginal in terms of expenditure, and amounts provided, in the better case, are hardly 
enough to ensure subsistence. Therefore, it would be more reasonable to increase 
replacement rates of residence-based pensions in Spain, up to a determined threshold 
between the current maximum non-contributory and the minimum pension. In this way, 
expenditure on basic complements to the minimum pension will be shifted to the non-
contributory level, promoting higher equality quotes and improving the living conditions 
of low earners. The justification behind this reform concerns the fact that, likewise 
stablishing a maximum, at some point in the individual’s life, the marginal benefit 
obtained from working an extra year will be zero, in the presence of complements to the 
minimum pension. Moreover, required funding to enable non-contributory pensions to 
embrace a higher percentage of the population, and increase replacement rates, might be 
obtained from this minimum complement through increasing minimum years of 
contribution up to the point where employees payback equals the minimum pension with 
no other complements required.  
To conclude, results evince that Dutch pensions generate larger inequalities, except for 
the first pillar. These inequalities are particularly notorious when looking at pension 
benefits from women in cluster 5, but are also appreciated in terms of net wealth and 
access to occupational pensions. Prominence of occupational pensions, through DC 
schemes get extra factors involved in retirement outcomes, which contribute to exacerbate 
inequality between individuals with different education levels or those with interrupted 
working lives. In Spain, the transition to a system where defined contributions plans 
increase in size, looks like the natural path to follow to diversify pensions’ financing, in 
view of how a more mature welfare state, such as the Dutch one, is organized. In fact, the 
conversion process has virtually started with the last reform but, it is vital to bear in mind 
that these systems are grounded on considerably high employability. In consequence, this 
new scenario will require deeper structural reforms on the Spanish labour market, as it is 
vital for it to progress in line with pensions.  
This study should be understood as a first step to further research on family-work 
trajectories and retirement matters. The methodology employed could be extended to 
other life spheres and, with the increasing longitudinal data available, the targets 
considered might be enriched with new empirical insights and theory development. 
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A.1. Appendix 1: Optimal Number of Clusters 
Table 3: Available quality measures at WeightedCluster R package. 
Available quality measures 
Name Abrv. Range Min/Max Interpretation 
Point Biserial 
Correlation 
PBC [-1;1] Max 
Capacity of the clustering to reproduce the 
original distance matrix. 
Hubert’s 
Gamma HG [-1;1] Max 
Capacity of the clustering to reproduce the 
original distance matrix (Order of magnitude). 
Hubert’s 
Somers D HGSD [-1;1] Max 
Same as above, taking into account ties in the 
distance matrix. 
Hubert’s C HC [0;1] Min 
Gap between the current quality of clustering 
and the best possible quality for this distance 
matrix and number of groups. 
Average 
Silouette 
Width 
ASW [-1;1] Max 
Coherence of the assignments. A high 
coherence indicates high between groups 
distances and high intra group homogeneity. 
Calinski-
Harabasz 
index 
CH [0; +∞[ Max Pseudo F computed from the distances. 
Calinski-
Harabasz 
index 
CHsq [0; +∞[ Max Idem, using the squared distances. 
Pseudo R2 R2 [0;1] Max Share of the discrepancy explained by the clustering. 
Pseudo R2 R2sq [0;1] Max Idem, using the squared distances. 
Source: Studer & Matthias, 2013 
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Figure 9: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with sequence 
analysis on family trajectories 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 10: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with sequence 
analysis on work trajectories 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 11: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with multi-
channel sequence analysis 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 12: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with sequence 
analysis on family trajectories (standardized scores) 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Figure 13: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with sequence 
analysis on working trajectories (standardized scores) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 14: Average cluster cut-off quality on pairwise distance matrix obtained with multi-
channel sequence analysis (standardized scores) 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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A.2. Appendix 2: Linear regression models on total individual 
pension income 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) 4.897,07*** 9.858,43* 
Female -1.475,86** -1.490,62 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 1.068,46 3.829,50 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 2.283,61 -1.202,73 
Cluster4 -706,66 -86,42 
Cluster5 -2.119,59** -6.847,83* 
Cluster6 41,55 1.637,84 
Cluster7 -1.770,86 -5.493,49 
Cluster8 -1.794,64 12.255,29* 
Politics 8,22 68,12 
Edu 117,68 230,39 
Business 4,58 -17,33 
Edu2 -52,672 -446,56** 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 23780 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,02237; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,008575 
F-statistic: 1,61 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
0,08355 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 8555 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,0182; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,001855 
F-statistic: 1,114 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,3454 
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A.3. Appendix 3: Linear regression models on total household 
pension income 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) 4.872,15*** 10.577,57* 
Female 611,28** -868,73 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 -1.663,00 5.070,90 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 1.054,14 -542,54 
Cluster4 -3.918,10 272,11 
Cluster5 -1.097,72 -10.410,49* 
Cluster6 -1.315,60 2.843,27 
Cluster7 -1.770,86 -5.014,09 
Cluster8 -4.690,85 9.286,60 
Politics 253,65 439,60 
Edu 238,23* 321,20 
Business -0,90 22,93 
Edu2 -30,83 -337,54 . 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 29010 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,01745; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,003484 
F-statistic: 1,25 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
0,2443 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 11190 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,0182; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,001855 
F-statistic: 1,047 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,4036 
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A.4. Appendix 4: Linear regression models on individual public 
pension income 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) 5.505,03*** 4.271,57* 
Female -850,27 . -33,03 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 -255,74 -300,43 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 1.893,02 769,08 
Cluster4 -418,65 -515,74 
Cluster5 -1.250,90 -2.030,53 
Cluster6 25,38 -367,30 
Cluster7 -1.237,05 -1.327,68 
Cluster8 -1.996,91 -180,43 
Politics -135,38 198,76 
Edu -34,22 -28,28 
Business -3,79 -19,40 
Edu2 14,17 -3,40 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 9497 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,007794; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,006313 
F-statistic: 0,5525 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
0,8803 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 7655 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,01053; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,005934 
F-statistic: 0,6397 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,809 
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A.5. Appendix 5: Linear regression models on individual 
occupational pension  income  
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) -593,65 5.720,23 . 
Female -616,56 -1.472,75 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 820,57 4.117,29 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 399,37 -1.958,03 
Cluster4 -280,83 456,31 
Cluster5 -862,65 -5.184,71 . 
Cluster6 2,06 1.999,51 
Cluster7 -527,02 -4.198,00 
Cluster8 165,63 12.337,89** 
Politics 141,29* -136,83 
Edu 150,27*** 255,65 
Business 8,26 2,55 
Edu2 -67,69 . -449,98** 
 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 21.890 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,02521; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,01135 
F-statistic: 1,819 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
0,0413 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 3.939 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,04138; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,02543 
F-statistic: 2,594 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,002201 
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A.6. Appendix 6: Linear regression models on individual private 
pension income 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) -14,31* -133,37* 
Female -9,03 15,16 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 -7,88 12,64 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 -8,78 -13,78 
Cluster4 -7,18 -26,99 
Cluster5 -6,03 367,41*** 
Cluster6 14,10 5,62 
Cluster7 -6,78 32,19 
Cluster8 6,65 97,83 
Politics 2,30 6,19 
Edu 1,63 3,02 
Business 0,11 -0,48 
Edu2 0,85 6,82* 
 
 
 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 389,8 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,04572; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,03216 
F-statistic: 3,37 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
0,00007957 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 146,7 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,00838; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,008124 
F-statistic: 0,5077 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,9105 
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A.7. Appendix 7: Linear regression models on individual income 
from other sources 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) -110,11 -958,01 . 
Female 196,58 -278,48 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 583,02 151,16 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 -119,53 372,60 
Cluster4 -451,69 -14,71 
Cluster5 -191,98 856,38 
Cluster6 -176,69 34,47 
Cluster7 401,93 -485,97 
Cluster8 -352,45 1.392,92 . 
Politics 61,75 38,07 
Edu 9,99 176,27*** 
Business 3,61 15,99** 
Edu2 6,30 -0,26 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 3.614 on 844 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,04804; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,0345 
F-statistic: 3,549 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
3,609×10-5 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 2.621 on 721 degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,01204; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,004402 
F-statistic: 0,7323 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
0,7203 
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A.8. Appendix 8: Linear regression models on individual net 
wealth in retirement 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) 68.721,8** -90.662,3** 
Female 27.870,9 . 11.778,3 . 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 -24.130,8 -40.382,1* 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 -71.339,8* -36.510,0 
Cluster4 -27.905 -7.365,8 
Cluster5 -93.096,7** -28.338,0 
Cluster6 -4.250,8 -2.059,7 
Cluster7 -18.952,1 -28.045,6 
Cluster8 -46.202,5 -19.792,4 
Politics 6.716,9** 10.719,8*** 
Edu 9.841,7*** 14.446,0*** 
Business 343,3 1.550,1*** 
Edu2 2.840,2* 10.023,9*** 
 
 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 186.600 on 844 
degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,1988; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,1874 
F-statistic: 17,45 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value:   
< 2,2×10-16 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 212.900 on 721 
degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,07492; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,05952 
F-statistic: 4,866 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
9,604×10-8 
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A.9. Appendix 9: Linear regression models on household net 
wealth in retirement 
Covariates Model 1: Spain Model 2: Netherlands 
(Intercept) 71.596* -72.164 
Female 18.358,4 .  111.490 
Male (base) NA NA 
Cluster1 -30.114,4 -165.683 
Cluster2 (base) NA NA 
Cluster3 -61.450,1 -196.410 
Cluster4 -26.819,6 -229.985* 
Cluster5 10.621,3 -200.688* 
Cluster6 -19.489,9 -125.984 
Cluster7 -95.385,3* -89.633* 
Cluster8 -52.924,5 -150.074 
Politics 6.314,7 . 15.091 
Edu 11.269*** 10.568 
Business 1.565,4*** 7.101*** 
Edu2 2.785,9* 18.839** 
 
MODEL 2 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 832.000 on 844 
degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,05978; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,04641 
F-statistic: 4,472 on 12 and 844 DF; p-value: 
5,414×10-7 
MODEL 1 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0,001 ‘**’ 0,01 ‘*’ 0,05 
‘.’ 0,1 ‘ ’ 1 
Residual standard error: 228.400 on 721 
degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0,1133; Adjusted R-
squared:  0,09858 
F-statistic: 7,68 on 12 and 721 DF; p-value: 
1,626×10-13 
  
